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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J. W. BROADWATER,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 15319

vs.
GLEN VAN TASSELL, ERMA VAN
TASSELL, his wife, and DICK
'liu'1 TASSELL,

Defendants.

VAN TASSELL'S BRIEF ON REHEARING

INTRODUCTION
On April 11, 1977 a trial was held before the Honorable
Duffy Palmer in Davis County concerning this action.

On May

16, 1977 the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment were entered.

This appeal was taken from

t~se Findings and Judgment.

On September 30, 1977 Van Tassell filed his brief with
this Court.

On October 26, 1977 respondent filed his brief.

~March 9, 1978 Van Tassell's reply brief was filed with this
Court.

Shortly thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to

Strike the Reply Brief.

On March 16, this matter was argued before this Court by
\I.,..

1''-bb?ls and by Mr. Cook.

.ll.t that time Mr. Tibbals renewed

~a Strike the Reply Brief and a thorough discussion
3

"

to the ~ontent of the reply brief and its relation-
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ship with the arguments raised by Van Tassell.
On April 12, 1978 this Court in a unanimous decision
affirmed the lower court's findings but reversed as to the
matter of attorney's fees.
On May 1, 1978 respondent petitioned for a rehearing a:.:
submitted his brief in support.

On May 4 this Court grante:

respondent's Petition for Rehearing and this matter is nowt;.
fore this Court on rehearing.
Since there is an absolute void in Utah case law conce::.·
ing the procedure to be used during a rehearing, inquiries
were made by both parties to this Court and its Clerk
certain questions.

cancer.~.

Based upon these answers Van Tassell in:

action assumes that he has now become the equivalent of a re:·
pondent because it is Broadwater' s burden to show that the c:.·
ginal decision was incorrect.

However, to eliminate confus:::.

as to the status of the parties no reference will be made ::.
this brief to either appellants or respondents since the p:·
ties are obviously different depending upon which stage of'.:.;
proceeding is being discussed.
Van Tassell also assumes that the only issue before t:::;
Court is the propriety of its previous decision in stn~i:.;
the attorney's fees from the judgment and that other rnai::e::
raised by Van Tassell in the previous nearing are not ar 9".Ja:.
in this proceeding.
Van Tassell has taken this opportunity t2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'.llS

understanding at this juncture for the benefit of Broad-

·,.;:icer and this Court so that a correction of these assumptions
be made before oral ar<Ju_'llent if necessary.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
van Tassell seeks ratification of the previous decision
reversing that part of the judgment relating to the awarding
of $8,500 in attorney's fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BROADWATER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW BY VAN TASSELL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE LOWER
COURT.
Broadwater in his rehearing petition makes the following
statement:
If the defendant's counsel did not consider the record supported the finding of
the court he was obliged under the existing precedent to make a timely objection
to the court's action and thereby afford
counsel the opportunity to present additional proof on that issue.
(Rehearing
Petition, p. 12).
3roadwater further comments:
~or

counsel for the defendant to acquiesce
in the action of the District Court in allowing attorney's fees (R., p. 464; Tr.,
p. 191) and not timely raise any issue
thereon when had the matter been raised
it could have been forthwith corrected is
~o permit the defendant to deprive the
piaintiff of a valuable contract right by
:up~j~~;.
T~is is neither fair nor just.
'?P:-. .o:ar'_-,c '°etition, p. 13).
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These statements must be considered remarkable since th. ey
seem to imply that Van Tassell was obligated to correct an:;
errors made by Broadwater during the trial so that oroad·11 ,:,:
would have an opportunity to sustain his burden.
Broadwater in his "Respondent's Brief" admits that be
appeal in this action is from a "trial".
p. 3) •

(Respondent's brie:

Under Broadwater' s theory any party in a trial pre-

ceeding is obligated to inform the other party that he has
failed to prove an essential part of his case so that the
failing party has not been denied due process.
Obviously, such an argument is absurd and Van Tassell;,;,
perfectly justified in "remaining silent" as to the

evide~c:

relating to attorney's fees in the lower court since this ·m
not a matter where formal objection was required.

During :::

trial it would have been ridiculous for Van Tassell to ente:
an objection that Broadwater had failed to put on evidence ::
cerning the proof of attorney's fees.

No such objection ex;:

After the Findings of Fact were entered by the trial :: :
Van Tassell had a choice of either bringing this failure tc:
lower court's attention or taking it directly on appeal. ;,;:
52 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically pr:·::
Upon motion of a party made not later than
ten days after entry of judgment the court
may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.
The motion may be made wit~ a ~~
tion for a new trial pursuant to Rul2 ),.
When findings of fact are made and 3.Ctl'.JI~
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tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings may thereafter be
raised whether or not the party raising the
question has made in the District Court an
objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. (Emphasis added).
It was, therefore, completely discretionary upon Van Tassell
whether to raise the sufficiency of the evidence concerning attorney's fees before the trial court.

Broadwater's arguments

tlat he has been denied "an opportunity" to argue this issue is
without merit since under Utah Rules there is no automatic right
that such issue be presented before the lower court.
Broadwater during oral argument and in his Petition for a
Rehearing blames Van Tassell for his own failure to produce evidence as to the reasonable value of attorney's fees or to put a
si..ipulation into the record that such evidence would not be necessary.

He continually states that it was agreed by counsel

md by the parties that such evidence would not be necessary.
Van Tassell disputes this fact and states for the record that no
such stipulation was ever entered into on behalf of Van Tassell.
This Court in Watkins v. Simones, 385 P.2d 154 (Utah 1963)
(cited by Broadwater in his Pe ti ti on for Rehearing, p. 9) stated
triat a stipulation not in the record cannot be considered by

t.'isi~ourt.

This Court stated:

~or is there any suggestion that the plainc~: ': s were in any way prevented from making

anrl tL1nging to this Court any record they
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have desired . • . . In any event, this Court
cannot consider facts stated in the briefs
which may be true but absent in the official record.
As stated by Justice Crockett in the original opinio::
this matter:
This Court has consistently held that such
an award (attorney's fees) just like any
other aspect of a judgment, must have a foundation in evidence and a finding based thereon.
Plaintiff fails to meet that burden.
The opinion is supported by numerous authorities

wh1c~

have held that it is the burden of the party seeking attom:'
fees to affirmatively prove or to obtain stipulations as;:::
reasonable value of such fees.
Co. v. Anderson, 433 P. 2d 608

In Brasher Motor and Finance
(Utah 1967) this Court stated

the following:
The Court awarded to the plaintiff attorney's fees based upon the promises set forth
in the notes issued by the corporate defendant.
It does not appear that there was evidence to support the award of attorney's fees
nor does it appear that the defendants agreed
that the Court might fix the amount of such
attorney's fees.
In view of the prior decisions of this Court it would appear that the
granting of attorney's fees based upon the
record in this case is error.
Id at 609-6lO.
In Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969) thi 5 c:;:·
stated that it has consistently held that an attorney's fee
may not be awarded where there is nothing

in the record tc ,_

tain the award either by way of evidence or by stipulat:::
the parties as to how the court may fix it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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...

Finally, in Financial Corporation v. Byld, 404 P.2d 670
(Ctah 1965) this Court made the following pertinent statements:
It is fundamental that the judgment must
be based upon findings of fact, which in
turn must be based upon the evidence. This
rule has been followed by this Court and
other jurisdictions in regard to awarding
attorney's fees.
Because both judges and
lawyers have special knowledge as to the
value of legal services, this is not always
required to be proved by sworn testimony.
It is sometimes submitted upon stipulation:
as to amounts; or that the Judge may fix it
on the basis of his own knowledge and experience; and/or in connection with reference to a Bar approved schedule. Any one
of these would have provided an evidentiary
basis for making the determination. However, it was an issue of fact which was
denied. Thus it was part of the plaintiff's
case to which it had the burden of proving.
Failing to offer proof of any character on
this issue had the same effect as would the
failure to offer proof as to any other controverted issue. There is nothing upon
which to base a finding.
The defendant's
objections that the finding as to attorney's
fees is not supported by any evidence is
well-taken and the judgment must be corrected in that particular.
Id. at 673-674.
The cases cited by Broadwater in his Petition for Rehearing do not contradict these well-established Rules of Civil

Procedure and eviden tiary requirements.
':he :lorth Salt Lake case

?·

4

In the Huber case and

(Broadwater's Petition for Rehearing,

i matters other than the sufficiency of evidence were being

"t':acked ar1ct the
·
"Yll.2..St

c ourt correctly stated that i·l l sue h cases o b -

be raised in the lower court.
Le

t';e Pettingill case (Broadwater' s Petition
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for Rehearing, p.

6) the issue there concerned instruction:
·
:.

the jury which necessarily involved objections to the
c0urt ai:. th.: llme they are made.

·rh·1 s again
·
· a far er;' :::·
is

sufficiency of the evidence and from Rule 52(b) whi"ch. spec,.
fically allows no objection to be made.
The Blair Enterprise case
hearing, p. 8)

(Broadwater' s Petition for

states the rule concerning the necessity

~e-

0:

proving attorney's fees and then states:
The trial court made findings thereon
based on evidence adduced, as stated in
the judgment, and although the record
fails to disclose the evidence, no objection was leveled against them, so we accept them as true taken under familiar
rules of review.
Id. at 1295.
A footnote following the word "evidence" in this quotation;:
the following, "No one designated it on appeal."

Id. at,,::

In the Blair Enterprise case it is apparent that nor.2 c:
the adverse parties objected to the reasonableness of tl",e ;:·..
ney' s fees at any stage in the appellate proceedings a:id ::.;:
this Court therefore ruled that such objection had been-,:;.;·:;:
Van Tassell argues, as will be stated later on in this t::e:,
that the sufficiency of this fee was impliedly assigned as:::
and that in any case it was brought to the court's a ttent;::.
prior to the decision in this matter.
The Johnson case (Broadwater' s Petition for Re'.-.eari:.:
9) was a ~ontana case involving a countercla~~
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:ees and concerned the issue of whether any attorney's fee was
legally reql:ired to be paid.

In this case, however, there was

Jo dispute that should Broadwater prevail in the action a rea-

sonable attorney's fee was legally required.

It is interesting

:c note that a prior Montana case cited in the Johnson decision
asain reiterates the requirement of evidence as to the amount
a::d sufficiency of the attorney's fee.

The Montana Supreme

Court in Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Corporation, 541
P.2d 56 (Mont. 1975) stated the following:

[I]n contested cases we are inclined to follow those states requiring the introduction
of proof from which a reasonable fee may be
determined.
To award a fee in such a case
without proof would be to disregard the fundamental rules of evidence. An award of fees,
like any other award, must be based on competent evidence.
Furthermore, the proper
determination of a legal fee is central to
the efficient administration of justice and
the maintenance of public confidence in the
Bench and Bar.
Because of respondents' failure of proof the award of fees was properly
denied.
Id. at 59.
Finally, the Gardner case cited by Broadwater (Petition for
?ehearing, p. 9) concerns an award of $150 in a divorce action.
There the court held that evidence as to a reasonable attorney's
fee '.,·as not necessary when the court awarded "only a modest fee"·

Certainly, it cannot be said that $8,500 fits into this "modest
:ee" ;:ategor:;.

3 r:ceidwa:"'-c's arguments throughout his Petition for Rehear-

~a~~er

was qualified to evaluate a reasonable
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attorney's fee are irrelevant.

It was Broadwater's obligati

to show in the record that a stipulation to that effect had
been approved by Van Tassell and his failure to do so clea(
precludes him from now relying upon Judge Palmer's expenen:'
or knowledge of the case.
In sununary, Broadwater does not have any due process r::
to correct errors committed by himself because Van Tassell :: ..
ed to point out such errors at the time of trial or subsequ;::
At the conclusion of a trial, whether it be tried before t::e
court or a jury, evidence must be sealed and laid to rest

~'-

less in those rare cases the trial court grants a new trial :

0

cause of newly discovered evidence or other extraordinary c::·
cumstances.
Broadwater is not entitled to now go back to the trial
court and reopen the trial as to the issue of attorney's fee:
any more than he would be entitled to reopen it as to the do.regarding the amounts of the notes themselves.
For these reasons, Broadwater' s arguments that he was:.;:
at the trial level are without merit and should be rejected:
this Court.
POINT II
BROADWATER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW ON APPEAL OF THIS CASE SINCF THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE REGARDING ATTORNEY 1 S FEES WAS RAISED BY VAN TASSELL A.c~D .
BROADWATER WAS GIVEN SUFFICIENT OPPuRTUNI'lr
TO CHALLENGE THIS POINT AND WAS NOT PRE!T ~
DICED
HARMED
IN ANY
WAY.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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Broadwater in his Petition for Rehearing argues that the
reply brief filed by Van Tassell contained new issues not before raised in appellant's main brief.
iDg, pp. 10-13).

(Petition for Rehear-

He further claims that such alleged raising

of the issue violated his right to due process in that he was
denied a hearing as to the problem of attorney's fees.
such contention is without merit.

Rule 75(d) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure states that no assignment of errors
is necessary.

Rule 75(p) (2) requires an appellant's brief to

state the argument under separate headings insofar as such separation is practicable.

Van Tassell in his brief in chief

under Point I stated, "The Court's Decision at Trial was not
Supported by the Evidence Presented".

This heading certainly

was sufficient as an assignment of error to attack the sufficiency of evidence relating to all the damages including attarney' s fees.

Questions on appeal concerning the sufficiency of

evidence do not require the specifics of other is sues and can
be plead more generally.

Ronse v. Favre, 103 P.2d 26 (Colo.

L94 O} •

While admittedly Mr. Fullmer did not mention that portion
of the court's decision concerning attorney's fees such omission is not fatal given the context of this case.
11f

-

The question

.;:; - .

" ~u,ticier:c:/ of evidence concerning the attorney's fees is an
Broadwater could not now complain of any
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lack of due process or notice had Fullmer simply made llie
statement,

"There was insufficient evidence to support the

award of dttorney's fees by the trial court."
There is nothing else that Van Tassell could do in his
main brief to bolster this statement since the absence of e·.·
dence cannot be cited.

As Justice Crockett stated in In Re

Lavelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372

(Utah 1952):

The sketchiness of appellant's brief in
this regard is excused in some degree by
the difficulties inherent in attempting to
point out specifically wherein there is
"no evidence" to support a given finding.
An appellant cannot be asked to go through
the transcript, showing how the testimony
reported on each page does not support the
finding.
Yet, insofar as it is practicable, he must detail, with citations to the
record where appropriate, the particulars
wherein the evidence touching the finding
is inconsistent therewith or is not of
enough moment to sustain it.
Id. at 375.
Since there was no evidence of a stipulation or evide":'
as to the reasonable value of the attorney's fees in the rec:
Van Tassell could do no more than to make this simple state·
ment.

While he neglected to do so specifically in the maiJ

brief he stated the following in the reply brief:
The record is absolutely void of any evidence
presented by plaintiff concerning reasonable
attorney's fees.
The record is also voi d of
any stipulation or agreement allowing the ,
court to make this conclusion based upon tne
court's own knowledge.
The absence of any ....
evidence to substantiate these attor:-ie;·' 5 r~"
requires a modification of the ;udgment •7:ic:c·
c.
ting this amount. Van Tassell Rep 1 Y sr1"'f
~ ' '
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Hr. Tibbals during the oral argument admitted that there
nothing in the record showing a stipulation as to the reascnaolc:ne:ss of dt-corncy 1 s fees or evidence proving this fact.
Broadwater has cited no evidence in his Petition for Rehearing to the contrary.

Thus, Broadwater can show no prejudice

by the fact that the statement as to attorney's fees was not

specifically mentioned until the reply brief even though the
question as to sufficiency of evidence had been generally raised
in

the main brief.
Broadwater argues he had no opportunity to refute the at-

torney' s fee question raised in the reply brief but can offer
no refutation on the merits.

Broadwater is attempting to util-

ize the general appellate procedural rule concerning briefing
to eliminate a legitimate question before this Court which was
:ienerally raised in the appellant's brief and in which no showing of prejudice has resulted.

Broadwater had sufficient op-

portunity to cite any evidence to the contrary at the oral argument and was totally unable to do so just as he would have
been unable to do so in
· t h e respon d ent 1 s b rie
· f •
Even if it were conceded that the appellant's brief did
not pronerlv·
·
~
- ra;~-"e th e question
o f su ff·iciency
o f evi· d ence,
cc•Jrts in numerous jurisdictions have held that an appellate
' 1 '--°·'."retion

:3

to overlook procedural infirmities in ap-

.:.u,=Jtions.

~n Yc~
Kingsbury,
379 p.
2d by 893
the
Sponsored by the S.J.''Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization
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defendant argued that the assignment of errors prepared by :
appellant was wholly inadequate because it did not distinct
specify each ground of error relied upon as re quire
· d by c:"
rules.

The Supreme Court of Arizona stated the following:
Strictly speaking we are of the opinion
that defendants' contention has merit.
But these assignments of error, though
poorly drawn, may be taken as an attempt
to urge the insufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the "Findings of Fact and
Judgments". Therefore, we will consider
plaintiff's assignments as sufficient to
present this issue to the Court, even
though it will require a great deal more
time and effort to search out the grounds
relied upon and the evidence relating
thereto.
Id. at 894.

The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Henderson v. Texas:;,
Mexico Pipeline Company, 131 P.2d 269

(N.M. 1942) was faced

with a similar argument that the procedural rules of the cou:·
had been violated.

That court stated the following:

It has been suggested also, by appellee,
that Section 6 of Rule XV, Supreme Court
Rules, has been violated by appellant in
that he failed to set out and state in his
brief the substance of all evidence bearing
upon the proposition, with proper references
to the transcript, in support of his contention that the Findings of Fact are not supported by substantial evidence. It is true
that appellant has not observed the rule,
exactly, in this respect. He does not set
out the substance of all evidence, bearing
upon the proposition, although it might be
said that he has omi~~ed none of it favorable to his position. .
. We cannot say cha"1
appellant's challenge to the evidence shCU'
under the particular circumstances, be Vi,
nored, although a strict adherence to the
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rule might so require. Yet, because of
the simplicity of the question at issue,
and its importance to the parties, we pass
the question of rule violation, if it be
that in fact, to consider the case upon
its merits.
Id. at 271-272.
(Emphasis
added).
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Neilson v. Bowles, 236 P.2d
286 (1955) stated that the court on its own motion may consider

errors not raised by either party if such consideration is necessary to do justice.

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Alaska in

'lorthern Corporation v. Chugach Electric Association, 52 3 P. 2d
1243 (Ala. 1974)

stated:

"We are always concerned with notions

of equity and fairness, regardless of whether they are presented
to us in argument."

Id. at 1245.

Also, the Supreme Court of

Oregon in State v. Hodes noted that the Supreme Court had discretionary power to notice errors even though not assigned if
such examination would be in the interest of justice.
Finally, in Bardeen v. Cornrnader Oil Company, 119 P.2d 967
(Ct. App. Cal. 1941) the California appellate court held that a
reviewing court is always at liberty to decide the case upon
any point which proper disposition may seem to require, whether
brought to the court's attention by counsel in the reply brief
for the first time or not.
rflt,

.

""us it can be easily seen from the preceding cases that

'-::re~cn.2 ('·:'tir~s
oroc~dural

of numerous

states do not strictly adhere

rules in cases where such procedure would

- ''-J> 3 llc:e c:o the parties.

Van Tassell, by alleging insuffi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

ciency of the evidence relating to attorney's fees did not
preclude Broadwater from arguing the merits of this conte~tion nor preuent !:i.T. from "having hi." day .i.n court".

The ls·

sue was initially raised by the general allegation of insuf·
ficiency of evidence and was specifically referred to int'.:
reply brief.

Broadwater was not in any way prejudiced by~:,

failure to respond to this point in his respondent's brief.
Van Tassell challenges Broadwater during this rehearir.:
to produce any evidence in the record which would have char.::
the result of this Court's decision authored by Justice Cree·
ett.

Van Tassell vigorously contends that this Court did"':

misconstrue or overlook any material fact or facts, base i:s
decision on some wrong principle of law, or misapply or ove:·
look something which would materially affect the results. ~
mings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619

(1921).

Broadwater was not denied due process of law during t:.,
appellate proceedings and was able to effectively present

i:.

argument in refutation to this Court upon oral argument . .,...:
. many cases the failur:
it is conceded by Van Tasse 11 t h at in
to adequately detail the error claimed may result in preju;::
to the opposing side this is surely not the case in an iss·;:
simple as to whether there was evidence supporting the coo!:
award of

atto~ney's

fees.

It would be extremely unjust and inequ1~able
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Ercadwater to escape his f ai 1 ure to prove at tor~ey' s fees
:nerely because of alleged inartful pleading by Van Tassell
.vher. ,-, 0 preJ c:c!ic2 is shown on the mere claim that Van Tassell

dJ.d not clearly set forth his assignment of error.

CONCLUSION
Broadwater in his Petition for Rehearing urges this Court
to reverse itself because of a failure of Broadwater to re-

ceive due process of law.

Van Tassell submits that Broadwater

was given due process of law in that a trial was held in which
:ie obviously emerged the victor.

For whatever reason, he failed

to prove one element of his damages which was that of reason~le

attorney's fees.

He argues that Van Tassell should have

warned him of this error and should have given him opportunity
to correct his mistake.

Van Tassell was not obligated to warn Broadwater of his
error, was not obligated to object during the trial to this
omission, and was not obligated to raise the insufficiency question before the trial court since Rule 52 (b) specifically allows

;o

party discretion without penalty.

Thus, Broadwater suf-

fAred
n0 1 oss of due process at the trial court level.
-~
Likewise, Broadwater was sufficiently apprised of Van Tas-

s~~l's clai'll
- ''--~' ~f

ty his first assignmt:!nt of error in his main brief.
J. '.:

.vere assumed that this statement was insufficient

'ad 3uff1~ient opportunity to argue the existence of
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any evidence at the oral argument, but could not do so becc.:,
of its absence.

u~cr.,

Broadwater is now attempting to rely

procedural rule of chis Court concerning i:Jr iei ing

i:o

~

.!

elir:n·, .. l
··~ .. i

the substantial right of Van Tassell in claiming that the

::J
!

court committed error in granting a judgment where no evid;:::,
was introduced to support it.

I

This Court was correct in its original deci<ion •rul
its equitable power this Court can review any question

°'' '

inc:.~

s sucn,

t:.::II

fore, the decision authored by Justice Crockett should be

re·i

appeal whether presented by the parties or not.

A

.

'

affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

CRAIG STEPHENS COOK
Attorney for Van Tassell
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